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Abstract
The Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) began building in the late 1980s on a 3-tiered 
structure of 146 laboratories with different and complementary technical and support capacities 
(poliovirus isolation, molecular strain characterization including sequencing, quality assurance, 
and research). The purpose of this network is to provide timely and accurate laboratory results to 
the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Deeply integrated with field case-based surveillance, it 
ultimately provides molecular epidemiological data from polioviruses used to inform 
programmatic and immunization activities. This network of global coverage requires substantial 
investments in laboratory infrastructure, equipment, supplies, reagents, quality assurance, staffing 
and training, often in resource-limited settings. The GPLN has not only developed country 
capacities, but it also serves as a model to other global laboratory networks for vaccine-
preventable diseases that will endure after the polio eradication goal is achieved. Leveraging 
lessons learned during past 27 years, the authors discuss options for transitioning GPLN assets to 
support control of other viral vaccine-preventable, emerging, and reemerging diseases.
Keywords
Poliomyelitis; Eradication; Laboratory; Networking; Legacy
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO (CC BY 3.0 IGO) License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/) which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
Correspondence: O. M. Diop, PhD, Polio Eradication, Director General’s Office, World Health Organization, Avenue Appia, 
CH-1211, Geneva 27, Switzerland (diopo@who.int). 
Disclaimer
Authors are staff members of the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the Task Force for Global 
Health, and the US Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention. The authors alone are responsible for the views expressed in this 
publication, and they do not necessarily represent the decisions, policy, or views of the World Health Organization, the Task Force for 
Global Health, the Pan American Health Organization, or the Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention.
Potential conflicts of interest
All authors: No reported conflicts. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Potential Conflicts of Interest. Conflicts that the 
editors consider relevant to the content of the manuscript have been disclosed.
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
J Infect Dis. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 July 01.
Published in final edited form as:
J Infect Dis. 2017 July 01; 216(Suppl 1): S299–S307. doi:10.1093/infdis/jix092.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Following the launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988 [1], the 
World Health Organization (WHO) adopted a model to achieve global coverage of 
laboratory services to support surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis, based on the 
experience with eradication efforts in the Region of the Americas. Selected laboratories were 
enrolled into a collaborating network, the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) 
coordinated by WHO. Network membership depended on nomination by host government, 
on-site evaluation by WHO of physical infrastructure, availability of suitably qualified 
personnel, and ability to accurately implement recommended procedures for poliovirus 
detection and characterization. Although not every country has a GPLN laboratory, each is 
linked to designated laboratories where specimens could be referred for rapid testing. After 
the initial decade of growth linked to introduction of regional eradication goals and 
corresponding surveillance programs, GPLN membership has been mostly constant; 
currently, 146 laboratories are enrolled and originally categorized into 3 groups (Figure 1) 
with defined responsibilities: (1) subnational and national laboratories (n = 123), (2) regional 
reference laboratories (n = 17), and (3) global specialized laboratories (n = 6).
Laboratory diagnosis of poliovirus consists of 3 consecutive main procedures: viral isolation 
for detection of the virus; intratypic differentiation to distinguish vaccine strains from wild 
poliovirus (WPV) strains; and, finally, sequencing for molecular epidemiology. These 
procedures were aligned with the 3 tiers within the GPLN. During recent years, the 
capacities of these laboratories have evolved tremendously, and GPLN’s laboratories have 
developed new capacities at all levels. It is noteworthy that >90 national/intercountry polio 
laboratories currently have intratypic differentiation capacity, and many regional and some 
national laboratories have sequencing capacities; 27 laboratories participated in the 2016 
proficiency testing as part of establishing this recognized capacity. In addition, these 
expanded capabilities will be an important factor in fulfilling requirements of the WHO 
Global Action Plan to minimize the poliovirus facility–associated risk of introducing 
eradicated viruses into the population. As part of the process defined by this plan and with 
the aim of containing poliovirus in a few facilities, some specialized and regional 
laboratories will be designated as polio-essential facilities for containment of polioviruses.
Since the beginning of the program, a core activity of the GPLN has been to test stool 
specimens from patients with acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) for the presence of polioviruses. 
More recently, sewage specimens are also tested in several countries as a supplement to AFP 
surveillance. It is noteworthy that strengthening environmental surveillance is driven by the 
need to improve detection of poliovirus circulation in countries and areas where surveillance 
and immunization indicators are suboptimal. These expanded efforts were led by the GPLN 
and including sampling site selection, concentration of the sewage specimens, and 
characterization of the isolated polioviruses.
The virological data provided by the GPLN, based on confirmed wild or vaccine-derived 
poliovirus (VDPV) circulation, underpin the GPEI decisions regarding where targeted 
immunization and surveillance activities should be conducted. The data are also used to 
monitor progress toward polio eradication by documenting the decreasing genetic diversity 
and recognizing transmission links of poliovirus isolates.
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Other public health programs dedicated to control or elimination of vaccine-preventable 
diseases (VPDs), have leveraged the GPLN model. The recently emerged or reemerged viral 
diseases—such as severe acute respiratory syndrome, dengue, Ebola, yellow fever, and 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus and Zika virus disease—can also benefit 
from GPEI assets, including the GPLN platform. As polio eradication approaches, the polio 
endgame opens opportunities to formulate and validate the best strategies to transition all 
assets generated by the GPEI. Globally coordinated political and financial efforts and 
integrated platforms to control, eliminate, and eradicate infectious diseases will be needed to 
secure polio eradication and add value to other current and future public health initiatives. 
However, care should be taken not to jeopardize polio eradication goals by premature 
transitioning.
TECHNICAL PILLARS OF THE GPLN
Poliovirus Detection and Characterization Procedures
WHO has standardized procedures used in the GPLN for testing of stool specimens from 
AFP cases. A consensus on recommended procedures was achieved through periodic 
informal consultative meetings convened by WHO for discussions among GPLN subject-
matter experts. Briefly, stool specimens from AFP cases are inoculated into cell cultures, and 
any polioviruses isolated have serotype and intratype determined. Partial genomic nucleotide 
sequences are generated for wild and programmatically important Sabin-related poliovirus 
isolates, and phylogenetic relationships among isolates are analyzed to investigate 
transmission linkages [2, 3].
None of the procedures used in the GPLN are available as commercial kits. Therefore, WHO 
assigns responsibility for production of standardized quality assured reagents to a few global 
specialized laboratories that also coordinate reagent and proficiency test distribution and 
collaborate to train personnel. The GPLN evaluates reagents, procedures and proficiency test 
materials under field conditions and on different equipment platforms to document 
performance characteristics and resolve operational concerns, in order to ensure accuracy of 
testing before adoption of new procedures.
Capacity Building
At enrollment, GPLN members varied in their capacities for laboratory testing. WHO 
laboratory coordinators in headquarters and all 6 regions, then and now, evaluate needs and 
leverage support from government and/or GPEI international partners to fill identified gaps 
and ensure uninterrupted availability of trained personnel; material resources for testing, 
analysis, and reporting of results; and appropriate infrastructure for safe storage and 
handling and disposal of infectious materials. A mixed approach is used to train personnel. 
Regional workshops are the most cost-effective way to simultaneously train multiple persons 
using standardized training curricula that allows time for practical work and covers 
theoretical aspects of procedures, equipment (selection, maintenance, and calibration), 
results analysis and interpretation, troubleshooting, reporting, and discussion of safety. An 
added benefit is the fostering of collaborative linkages with facilitators and peer learning 
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among participants. Two other training approaches are on-site training conducted by WHO 
staff or consultants, and trainee assignments to reference laboratories.
Indicators for Monitoring Laboratory Performance
Process indicators are used to monitor completion of each stage of testing and overall 
reporting time to ensure the timely availability of results for program action. Outcome 
indicators monitor the accuracy of testing through testing of quality control materials and 
annual proficiency tests. Overall quality assurance is monitored through annual auditing of 
network laboratories by WHO-assigned external reviewers, who use a standardized checklist 
and scoring system to determine whether laboratories meet defined performance criteria. 
Laboratories that fail the audit must test samples in parallel with an accredited reference 
laboratory until performance problems are resolved.
Results Reporting, Data Sharing, Management, and Ownership
The GPEI is a data-driven program. Laboratory results confirm geographic locations of 
poliovirus transmission and are used in planning of responsive immunization actions. Data 
sharing relationships were established among laboratories and immunization and 
surveillance personnel (Figure 2). In early phases of the GPEI, electronic data management 
systems and Internet were absent from many laboratories in resource-constrained settings. 
WHO mobilized resources and designed databases, procured computer and communication 
equipment, and trained laboratory personnel in electronic data management.
Currently, laboratories share databases weekly with WHO and national authorities. WPV, 
VDPV, and partial genomic nucleotide sequence results, however, are shared within 1–2 
days of their availability. Separate databases are maintained by laboratories that sequence 
viruses, but sequences are shared among laboratories as needed to perform phylogenetic 
analyses, particularly related to virus importations and VDPV emergence. In the event of 
new scientific discoveries, all laboratories making significant contributions to testing and 
analysis are represented among coauthors of scientific publications.
Changes in Management
As the GPEI program evolved, changes to AFP surveillance policies (eg, universal adoption 
of virological confirmation and discontinuing use of the poliomyelitis clinical case 
definition) and performance targets (AFP case detection rate shifted from 1 to 2 per 100 000 
in persons <15 years of age in polio-endemic regions) [4, 5] caused significant increases in 
laboratory workloads (Figure 3). The GPLN responded with diverse approaches that 
included increasing staffing levels and testing supplies redistribution of specimens to other 
laboratories with capacity, and extending work time or adding work shifts to manage 
workload.
As foci and intensity of WPV transmission decreased, WHO shortened target laboratory 
reporting time (Figure 4) to expedite implementation of responsive immunization 
campaigns. The GPLN achieved a 50% reduction in reporting time by changing the testing 
algorithm, which shortened the observation time for inoculated cell cultures and replaced 
serological based testing with faster molecular tests to determine serotype and intratype and 
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screen for VDPVs [2, 6, 7]. Another significant change was building capacity in more 
laboratories to perform molecular tests, which eliminated the time associated with shipping 
specimens and isolates between laboratories.
Detection of a poliomyelitis outbreak in Hispaniola caused by circulation of VDPV type 1 
viruses [8] caused further changes in the GPLN. Retrospective nucleotide sequencing of 
archived Sabin-related polioviruses confirmed a prior multiyear VDPV type 2 outbreak in 
Egypt. The GPLN developed, evaluated, and implemented a real-time polymerase chain 
reaction procedure to routinely screen Sabin-related isolates to detect certain key mutations 
commonly found in VDPVs [7]. During field evaluation of the method, VDPV outbreaks 
were retrospectively detected in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Nigeria 
[9].
Suspicions about weaknesses in AFP surveillance based on detection of genetic gaps among 
WPVs in some countries led to adoption of a supplemental surveillance approach that 
involves testing sewage samples collected from the environment or treatment plants [10]. 
Since 2000, this supplemental approach was newly established or expanded in selected 
countries, with results routinely used for program monitoring and planning. (Countries 
conducting supplementary environmental surveillance for PV detection include Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Guinea, India, Indonesia, 
Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, and South Africa.) Looking to the future, the 
GPLN spearheaded policy development requiring containment of polioviruses through 
destruction or use of enhanced biosafety and biosecurity for handling of polioviruses in the 
posteradication era.
Characterization of Costs
The GPLN surveyed its members to characterize the costs and funding sources for work 
done in support of the GPEI [11]. The survey documented that governments are the major 
funders, meeting the majority of operational and staffing costs for laboratories. GPEI 
partners mostly support training of personnel, production of standardized test reagents and 
control materials, proficiency test programs, procurement of commodities in a few reference 
laboratories that serve multiple countries, and personnel costs associated with network 
coordination. These survey results were used by WHO for planning and resource 
mobilization. A key finding of this survey is that approximately 10% of the GPEI’s total 
AFP surveillance budget is spent on the GPLN, which highlights the fact that the expected 
value of surveillance information from the GPLN currently exceeds its costs.
LEVERAGING GPLN ASSETS TO SUPPORT OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH 
INITIATIVES
An enduring contribution of polio eradication and the GPLN is the close integration on a 
global scale of field and laboratory-based surveillance and public health action. Before the 
launch of the GPEI and development of the GPLN, such integration was sporadic in many 
settings and virtually nonexistent in others. The GPLN opened an avenue for virologists and 
microbiologists worldwide to contribute more directly to the public health needs within and 
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beyond their own communities. The clearly evident benefits of the GPEI and other VPD 
control programs fostered development of additional global and Regional laboratory 
networks supporting surveillance for other VPDs. Conditions for establishment and 
maintenance of laboratory networks, however, vary widely across WHO regions and the 
phases of each VPD control program.
Adding Value by Laboratory Networking
Establishment of the first comprehensive regional polio laboratory network in the Americas 
benefitted from the relative prosperity of the region, a widely shared Pan-American 
perspective, and the prospect of regional polio eradication within 5 years [12]. However, 
with certification of polio-free status by the Regional Certification Commission in 1994 
[13], emphasis quickly shifted from polio to other VPDs, especially measles and rubella, and 
new regional networks grew from the polio network. This serially focused approach to VPD 
control aimed to leverage the gains in vaccine coverage and surveillance achieved through 
polio eradication, while effectively using the limited public health resources available. 
Success hinged on the relative geographic separation of the Americas and the moderate 
transmissibility of poliovirus.
The Western Pacific Region, with China at its center, has maintained sensitive poliovirus 
surveillance since certification in 2000 [14], as the risk of outbreaks from imported virus 
[15, 16] and VDPV emergence continues [17, 18], even as it expands laboratory support to 
broader VPD control activities. The European Region, certified polio free in 2002 [19] has 
maintained high rates of vaccine coverage in Western and Central Europe, but coverage and 
integrated poliovirus surveillance declined as resources were redirected in some Central 
Asian and Eastern European countries, leading to outbreaks from imported WPV [20] and 
VDPVs [18]. Virologists in India and other countries in the South-East Asia Region have 
continued to support intensive, sensitive poliovirus surveillance since certification in 2014 
[21], as their colleagues in the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions continue to track 
the last chains of WPV transmission [22] and alert the GPEI of the emergence of VDPVs 
[18]. All GPLN laboratories are needed to help the GPEI safely navigate the polio endgame 
[23].
Laboratories of the GPLN have been instrumental in the initial detection and 
characterization of newly emerging pathogens and diseases of public health importance, 
including severe acute respiratory syndrome, outbreaks of paralytic disease associated with 
enterovirus 71, and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. Many of the molecular 
methods first introduced by the GPLN, such as diagnostic polymerase chain reaction and 
genetic sequencing as an epidemiological tool, are now widely applied throughout other 
laboratory networks to identify and track infectious disease agents (eg, Ebola recently).
Building on Geographic and Technical Convergences Between Laboratory Networks
From the outset, polio eradication was seen as the next step in a long-term strategy for 
global control of VPDs, with the concomitant strengthening of global public health 
infrastructure, including public health laboratories. Active collaboration across VPD 
laboratory networks is facilitated by overlapping technical expertise, frequent colocation of 
Diop et al. Page 6
J Infect Dis. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 July 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
viral VPD laboratories (eg, measles/rubella, rotavirus, yellow fever [in Africa]. and Japanese 
encephalitis [in South-East Asia and Western Pacific regions]), shared facility resources, 
often under the same laboratory leadership, and the shared imperative to support infectious 
diseases elimination or control activities in different regions.
Ensuring Continued Support to Public Health Activities
Although continued poliovirus surveillance and laboratory investigations remain essential to 
secure the endgame [23], the GPLN will continue to serve as a model for infectious disease 
laboratory networks. This is especially true for VPD networks, which support efforts to “go 
on offense” against infectious diseases. Although VPD networks have still untapped 
potential to support key public health initiatives, many VPD laboratories and their 
supporting WHO coordinators are severely overstretched. Further expansion of capacity will 
require additional investments in human as well as material resources, investments which 
have proved to be highly cost-effective. Fundamental to this goal is the need for (1) strong 
ownership of laboratory networks by countries and/or regional bodies, including sustained 
funding, and (2) investments by all countries in the academic training of laboratory staff 
prepared to support future, broadened public health initiatives.
PLANNING GPLN’S TRANSITION TO SUPPORT OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH 
ACTIVITIES
Situational Analysis
A SWOT (strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis after 25 years of GPLN 
functioning was conducted in 2014. The main outcomes are compiled in Figure 5. In 
summary, the members of the GPLN have stressed the following strengths: the network 
structure, the efficient collaboration/coordination at different levels within the GPLN, the 
integration with the Expanded Program for Immunization, the high competency and 
reliability of laboratory personnel, the ability to adopt new methods, an excellent quality 
assurance system ensuring accuracy of results, and a strong laboratory data management 
system. The main areas where the GPLN should continue improvement efforts include 
finding sustainable mechanisms for national support, streamlining financial support to 
laboratories, and strengthening managerial skills at laboratory level. Lessons learned from 
the GPLN should help foster interregional relationships under the Global Health Security 
Agenda framework to build countries’ capacities and optimize costs to prevent, detect, and 
respond to infectious diseases threats.
Over the years, the GPLN has efficiently demonstrated capacity to overcome weaknesses 
and threats. As an example, communication with Expanded Program for Immunization 
personnel has been improved, ensuring tight and efficient links between the 2 components of 
the AFP surveillance system. Moreover, the high turnover rate of competent staff has always 
been compensated by regular training and integration of new staff.
In addition, whenever funding or capacity building opportunities were offered by GPEI 
partners, the GPLN was able to leverage resources and innovate to maintain high quality 
standards. Implementation of environmental surveillance of polioviruses in 13 GPLN 
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laboratories in the African, Eastern Mediterranean, and South-East Asia regions during the 
last 5 years highlights the receptivity to changes aiming to improve diagnostic capacities of 
the network [24]. Rapid evolution and adoption of molecular assays for detection of WPVs 
and VDPVs is another significant example.
Need for Protecting Investments and Sustaining Services Until Global Certification and 
Beyond
Since its creation, the GPLN has accumulated tremendous investments in human resources, 
infrastructures and equipment. Furthermore it was able to build an efficient networking 
system to proactively identify gaps and propose adequate solutions and be able to efficiently 
conduct troubleshooting, learn lessons and develop improvement plans. As an example, the 
real-time monitoring of poliovirus evolution has permitted timely adaptation of molecular 
diagnostic procedures in 2015 to detect viruses belonging to new clusters or lineages. At this 
stage of the GPEI, it is of utmost importance to protect these investments, mainly the biggest 
assets of the GPLN, its well-trained and dedicated human resources and efficient operational 
principles.
Indeed, there is a need to sustain the services and contributions of polio laboratories through 
and beyond the process of global certification of poliomyelitis eradication. Transitioning the 
GPLN assets toward other public health programs is an important part of the endgame 
strategic plan, and it is noteworthy that GPEI partners increasingly recognize the worth of 
building health systems rather than focusing on specific vertical programs or initiatives.
A quick review of the ongoing consultations and brainstorming on this area of work points 
toward different options for the future of the GPLN, the main ones being evolution toward 
regional laboratory networks devoted to specific diseases, integration with existing global 
VPD laboratory networks, and transforming the GPLN to a core network for broader support 
of public health activities and emergencies.
It is clear and consensual that an efficient public health laboratory is needed in all countries, 
but to reach this goal several challenges need to be overcome. First, in many low-resource 
countries, the health laboratory network is nonexistent owing to lack of infrastructure, which 
hampers adequate mainstreaming of polio surveillance functions (needed in the long-term) 
into national activities. Second, this heterogeneity among countries’ capacities makes 
difficult to align visions, secure resources, and ensure efficient in-country implementation of 
any transition plan. Finally, it is critical to build networking capacity up front among all 
stakeholders to ensure successful transition.
For each of these options it is necessary to conduct in-depth analysis of costs and 
comprehensively weigh health and financial benefits, cost-effectiveness, and cost savings. 
Indeed, maintaining political commitment and funding from countries and donors is the key 
driver for a successful transition of GPLN assets to support public health programs, and this 
can be obtained only if clear and measurable objectives are established and benefits are 
clearly delineated.
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KEY PREREQUISITES TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE TRANSITION
Aligning Visions of GPEI Partners
There are several enabling factors for successful transition of GPLN assets. The first is 
alignment across the GPEI partnership on the direction of the program after certification, 
which will provide a solid ground for a platform that includes (1) retaining a 
postcertification surveillance capacity to sustain polio eradication, (2) continuing to share 
assets with established laboratory networks for effective integration, and (3) using human 
resources and operational assets to provide support for emerging and reemerging diseases 
outbreaks.
Funding
Development of this platform can meet the interests of different stakeholders and donors to 
build health systems rather than funding competing health programs that affect performance 
of highly qualified laboratory personnel and cost-effectiveness. However, because donor 
funding is difficult to predict, maintaining the fundraising capacity of the GPEI should be 
part of the global transition plan. The model of polio surveillance to be implemented after 
eradication, mainly the environmental surveillance of poliovirus in this model, will be the 
cost driver and needs to be carefully considered to ensure the sustainability of the platform. 
Indeed, when eradication of polio will be achieved after several missed milestones and 
setbacks, engagement of different stakeholders for long-term support may change. At that 
point, the best insurance that base-level funds will continue to be available is to convince 
donors of the cost-effectiveness of their investments.
Delineating Short- and Long-Term Transition Activities
From lessons learned in building laboratory capacity and networks, a phased transitioning 
strategy of GPLN assets that clearly distinguishes short-term activities after certification 
(section Aligning Visions of GPEI Partners above) and a long-term plan seems the best way 
to develop the platform successfully. While moving forward with this process, the GPLN 
should ensure that unfinished works in the current strategic plan are completed (eg, 
diversification and strengthening of laboratory personnel’s managerial skills, renewal of old 
equipment, and scale-up of effective modern communication and information systems).
CONCLUSIONS
The GPLN since its creation in 1989 has provided valuable support to the GPEI by ensuring 
that timely and accurate data are available to orient both field surveillance and immunization 
activities. Although polio eradication is getting closer, it is of utmost importance to secure 
eradication but also plan for transitioning skills and assets that were built worldwide during 
>2 decades. Because the GPLN is perceived as one valuable part of the GPEI to be 
leveraged, this article describes some of its achievements (Figure 6) and potential avenues 
for better use of this network after certification. At the GPEI level, ongoing work aims to 
identify opportunities for integration of polio assets and/or functions into other program 
areas or mainstream them into the national health infrastructure.
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The simplest thinking is to fully transition GPLN assets to VPD networks that have already 
built their capacities based on the GPLN model. In fact, integration of the GPLN with these 
networks is already a reality in places where both capacities coexist in the same laboratory. 
This integration of (1) skills and assets (human resources, infrastructures, equipment, and 
consumables) and (2) activities related to quality management needs to be pursued and 
reinforced, the prerequisite being sustained funding of the GPLN. It is not certain that the 
level of funding for eradication, elimination, and/or control initiatives will be maintained. 
Importantly, GPLN’s skills and assets that can really make the difference are the established 
networking system and the highly trained staff in charge of operations to ensure both the 
efficiency and sustainability of laboratory support to eradication programs but also to other 
public health interventions where and when needed (eg, influenza pandemic or Ebola crisis).
Therefore, transition planning to enable both (1) maintenance of a polio diagnostic capacity 
to secure polio eradication and (2) development of a core capacity/platform, which can be 
used to support VPDs but also outbreaks or events of emerging or reemerging diseases, will 
be the best trade-off to reconcile and manage expectations from GPEI’s partners, other 
global public health initiatives, and WHO member states. Furthermore, this process will 
allow retention of skilled laboratory staff by engaging them in new areas of work, preserve 
the essential linkages between field and laboratory surveillance, and consequently maintain 
the capacities of countries to respond to health emergencies.
While planning the transition of GPLN assets and skills toward support of other public 
health initiatives, it is important to comprehensively map out, evaluate, and document 
investments, assets, and skills that have maintained and strengthened the GPLN system, 
including networking capacity, for nearly 27 years. This information will inform a GPEI 
position paper on how to manage risks and opportunities associated with the eradication of 
polio and provide support to member states for a successful transition.
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Figure 1. 
Diagram showing tiered structure and functions of the Global Polio Laboratory Network. 
Abbreviations: ITD, intratypic differentiation; PT, proficiency testing; QC, quality control.
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Figure 2. 
Diagram showing laboratory data flow in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. 
Abbreviation: WHO HQ, World Health Organization headquarters.
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Figure 3. 
Changes in detections of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and wild poliovirus (WPV) between 
1998 and 2016. Abbreviations: AFR, African Region; AMR, Region of the Americas; EMR, 
Eastern Mediterranean Region; EUR, European Region; SEAR, South-East Asia Region; 
WPR, Western Pacific Region.
Diop et al. Page 15
J Infect Dis. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 July 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Figure 4. 
Global Polio Laboratory Network changes to testing algorithm to shorten laboratory 
reporting time. Abbreviations: ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; NA, not 
applicable; NSL, non–Sabin-like; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; PV, poliovirus; RT-PCR, 
reverse-transcription PCR; VDPV, vaccine-derived poliovirus; VP1, viral protein 1; WHO, 
World Health Organization.
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Figure 5. 
Word cloud analysis based on the frequency of words used during the SWOT (strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis. When some key words were cited in 
different categories, their sizes are proportional to their relevance in the each categories.
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Figure 6. 
Main achievements of the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN). Abbreviation: WHO, 
World Health Organization.
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